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ALPHEUS T. MASON AND THE ART OF 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 
J. Woodford Howard, Jr. • 
Alpheus T. Mason was the premier judicial biographer of his 
generation and most likely of this century. He wrote more impor-
tant biographies of jurists than any American writer: Brandeis: A 
Free Man's Life (1946), Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 
(1956), and William Howard Taft: Chief Justice (1964). Each is 
different in scope and technique. All are outstanding in quality. 
His masterpiece, Harlan Fiske Stone, broke new ground in our un-
derstanding of the Supreme Court during a critical transformation 
in American government and revolutionized the medium of judicial 
biography itself. While mindful that his other writings virtually 
created the field of American political thought in political science 
and contributed significantly to teaching and dissemination of 
knowledge about American constitutional law and the Supreme 
Court, I believe that judicial biography occasioned his most creative 
and enduring scholarship. Brandeis and Taft remain leading works 
on their subjects. Stone is the greatest judicial biography yet writ-
ten. It accomplished for understanding of the twentieth century 
what Albert J. Beveridge's The Life of John Marshall (1916-1919) 
did for the nineteenth and set the standards by which subsequent 
biographies of judges are judged. 
To understand this achievement, it is useful to recall the con-
text and conceptions of Mason's biographical work. Judicial biog-
raphy, a handmaiden of legal realism, Progressivism, and political 
jurisprudence, was still a cutting edge in the 1940s and 1950s. It 
attracted some of the ablest scholars in law-related disciplines.! 
Competition from contemporaries like Charles Fairman, Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, and Carl B. Swisher was keen. At the same time, 
their focus on individual Justices and their historical-philosophical-
• Thomas P. Stran Professor of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University. An 
earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, San Francisco, September I, 1990. I wish to thank Michael Strine for 
research assistance and David J. Danelski and Patrick Lee for helpful comments. 
I. Konefsky, Men of Great and Little Faith: Generations of Constitutional Scholars, 30 
BUFFALO L. REv. 365 (1981). See, The Writing of Judicial Biography-A Symposium, 24 
IND. L.J. 363 (I 949). 
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legal techniques faced stiff challenges from group-oriented scholars 
and behavioralists bent on generalization, quantification, and scien-
tific explanation. Mason, without belaboring epistemology and 
struggling for tenure, made no bones about where he stood in these 
battles. Far from science, judicial biography was the art of creating 
"a portrait in words. "2 
As an art form, biography was a hybrid requiring a delicate 
blending of skills. A biographical portrait, he wrote in 1978, is "a 
record of human action and reaction, temperament and emotion," 
handicapped by a medium-words-"less malleable than clay or 
paint." The preliminary gathering and sifting of data call for the 
talents of historians; the transition from historian to artist requires 
the novelist's ability to render the subject's inner world and worth. 
"The biographer's task," said Mason, "is to blow the breath of life 
into inert fragments-mementoes, notes, letters, diaries, dry as dust 
documents. Only then does a biography emerge as a work of art. "3 
Judicial biography, above all, was an art of selection, discrimi-
nation, and balance. Subjectivity in choice of subject, evidence, and 
audience was an inescapable part of the biographer's craft. Hence, 
there was "no one best way of writing biography." Approaches 
necessarily varied according to what the biographer brought to the 
task and "wherever the subject leads." Definitiveness, often associ-
ated with the genre, was a delusion. Every generation would write 
its own biographies. Any biographer aiming for the last word was 
doomed to the fate of the writer of a book entitled "The S.O.B.'s of 
Boone County As I Have Known Them." "Every time I think I am 
through," he said, "I discover another."4 
The concept of biography as an art form may underlie both the 
strengths and weaknesses of Mason's work. Several factors account 
for his strengths. First, he selected only major figures for subjects. 
The authorized biographer of Brandeis and Stone, he left "second 
rank figures" to others.s If these choices contributed to the "cult of 
the great judicial personality," the combination of his subjects' 
characters, careers, and available materials in many ways shaped 
his biographical strategy in each work.6 For example, less than one-
fourth of Brandeis is devoted to the great man's twenty-three years 
on the Supreme Court. Whether or not this proportion is conso-
2. Mason, Vicarious Living: A Biographer's Reward, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 396 (1978). 
3. /d. at 396, 397. 
4. /d. at 397-99. 
5. /d. at 397. Justice Felix Frankfurter apparently thwarted his attempt to work on 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, whose papers were destroyed by Judge Irving Lehman. 
6. J. Peltason, Supreme Court Biography and the Study of Public Law in EssAYS ON 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 219 (G. Dietze ed. 1964). 
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nant with the Court years' relative significance in Brandeis's career, 
the primary reason for Mason's treatment was lack of access to 
Brandeis's judicial papers, although Mason did spend ten days in 
1940 interviewing the retired Justice at his summer cottage on Cape 
Cod under Mrs. Brandeis's watchful eye and over spartan lunches 
of Spam. Having worked a decade and published three preliminary 
studies on Brandeis, 1 Mason made the best of the situation by writ-
ing a well-balanced portrait of the character and career for a general 
audience, which became a Book of the Month Club selection and 
best seller. 
Stone, published six years after he was approached by the fam-
ily, had virtually the reverse proportions. Stone's unedited judicial 
papers were extraordinarily rich. Writing with astonishing speed, 
Mason seized the opportunity to publish the first biography provid-
ing a scholarly, inside history of the Supreme Court at work.s The 
three-pound volume won the American Library Association's Lib-
erty and Justice Award for the most distinguished book of the year 
in history and biography. Taft, a byproduct of a comprehensive 
study of the chief justiceship that came to naught, concentrated on 
the jovial conservative's indefatigable leadership in modernizing the 
federal judiciary. Based on a massive collection of Taft's private 
papers in the Library of Congress, this work is a fine leadership 
study in judicial politics, not to mention "new institutionalism." 
Timing also had much to do with the impact of Mason's biog-
raphies. Brandeis appeared only five years after the Justice's death, 
Stone only ten after his. Unlike most scholarly biographies of ju-
rists, these works were contemporary history. They sparkled with 
fresh controversies and actors, including Justices Reed, Black, 
Douglas, and Frankfurter, who were very much alive and kicking. 
Even Taft appeared when the saliency of its issues such as doctrinal 
vs. institutional leadership, judicial selection, and proprieties on the 
bench throbbed with current meaning. In timing as well as sub-
jects, the biographer showed no mean eye for opportunities. 
Chance, as Pascal observed, favors the prepared man. 
More important is the artistry that Mason brought to each pro-
ject. As a portraitist of judges in action he had few rivals. His nar-
rative gifts, his eye for revealing incidents and ear for quotations, 
breathed life into characters great and small. Just as the Roberts 
retirement letter or Harold Laski's fabrications reclaimed Justices 
7. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND JUIXiE IN THE MODERN STATE (1933); A. 
MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY: A CASE STUDY IN THE WORKINGS OF DEMOCRACY (1938); 
and A. MASON, BUREAUCRACY CONVICTS ITSELF: THE BALLINGER·PINCHOT CONTRO· 
VERSY OF 1910 (1941). 
8. S. FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 748 (1984). 
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to humanity, so internal debates over the flag salute and war powers 
cases soared with the majesty of judges approximating our impossi-
ble expectations of the judicial role. Though eschewing psyches and 
sex, Mason shared Anthony Trollope's understanding of the pub-
lic's endless fascination with how prominent persons "encounter the 
changes which come upon us all."9 Personal stories made the 
medicine of legal realism and judicial policymaking go down easily. 
For readers used to impersonal histories and theories of law, his 
biographies pack a powerful punch. Never before, and seldom 
since, have the personal and volitional dimensions of judging been 
probed so intimately. 
In addition, Mason was a graceful stylist who labored hard to 
satisfy his generation's expectations of biography as literature. Like 
painters who copy the masters to learn their craft, I have often re-
visited his work to see how he handled a similar problem. I discov-
ered an uncanny ability to write his way around a hole. Taft 
demonstrated his appreciation of the minimalist's theme that less 
can be more. 
The endurance of his biographies depends most, I suspect, on 
the broad modelling of his judicial portraits. Besides being a legal 
realist and a passionate New Dealer, Mason practiced political ju-
risprudence. The 6th edition of the Mason and Beaney casebook on 
American constitutional law could hardly be more explicit: 
The Supreme Court has always consisted largely of politicians, appointed by politi-
cians, confirmed by politicians, all in furtherance of controversial political objec-
tives. From John Marshall to Warren Burger, the Court has been the guardian of 
some particular interest and the promoter of preferred values.IO 
Each biography elaborated these themes implicitly. The wide-
angle lenses he employed to put the subject in context overcame the 
hazards of focusing on a single life. His portraits were analyses of 
"judges & co.," broadly conceived. Anchored in the empirical rock 
of documents and papers, they guided readers into longer historical 
lines and philosophic implications of cases, especially enduring con-
flicts between private property and public power, liberty versus se-
curity, and the legitimacy of judicial review in a popular 
democracy. Thus, what Mason described after the fact as portrai-
ture others saw as case studies in judicial politics and vehicles to 
consider clashing ideas in government. 
9. A. TROLLOPE, ANTHONY TROLLOPE: AN ILLUSTRATED AUTOBIOGRAPHY 136 
(1987). 
10. A. MASON & W. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xiii (6th ed. 1978). 
See M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO 
PoLITICAL JuRISPRUDENCE (1964). 
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Justice Brandeis admonished him to "state the facts and let the 
characterizations suggest themselves." 11 Generalizations and final 
verdicts, Mason concurred, were the job of readers, not biogra-
phers. Yet he often warned students that facts cannot speak for 
themselves; facts are ordered by theory. However unscientific, his 
narratives connected persons, processes, and policies to the polity. 
No careful reader of his accounts of the 1937 Court-packing fight or 
the war power cases could miss links among individuals, institu-
tions, and great issues stirring the country. Nor could one fail to 
get the realist's message that judges make law and public policy-
and its constraining counterpoint that they do so in groups. The 
Supreme Court was hardly a "vehicle of revealed truth."12 
Mason's biographies straddled sharp divisions over methodol-
ogy in law-related disciplines because they offered something to al-
most everyone. Readers interested in processes external to the 
central actor, readers interested in how a judge's background, val-
ues, and role conceptions affected behavior, and readers with tradi-
tional historical and jurisprudential concerns found something to 
value in Mason's work. Jack W. Peltason, a pioneer of the interest 
group approach to law and policy, made this point over twenty-five 
years ago in an insightful evaluation which concluded that Mason 
was "the man who made judicial biography worthwhile."l3 Seven 
years later I repeated it to aspiring social scientists with a partly 
tongue-in-cheek inventory of behavioral propositions in fifteen lead-
ing biographies. Stone led the pack.l4 
Walter F. Murphy has compiled a highly useful set of the func-
tions of judicial biographies as case studies. These are to: (1) im-
part knowledge about the judiciary in the governmental process, 
(2) relate the character to the office, (3) reconstruct the judge's val-
ues that influence decision making, ( 4) place the judge and the court 
in context of the times, (5) illuminate the group phase of judging, 
(6) describe the roles of courts in the political system, and (7) pro-
vide useful data for scholars of many interests. Is On all points Ma-
son's biographies, especially Stone and Taft, again win high marks. 
His accounts of the interplay of personalities, ideas, and intramural 
bargaining added new dimensions to analyses of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation. His biographies are the most vivid pictures 
II. Mason, supra note 2, at 398. 
12. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: VEHICLE OF REVEALED TRUTH OR POWER 
GROUP? (1953). 
13. Peltason, supra note 6, at 227. 
14. Howard, Judicial Biography and The Behavioral Persuasion, 65 AM. POL Sci. REV. 
704 (1971). 
15. Murphy, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 725, 728-29 (1969). 
46 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:41 
of the Supreme Court as a working institution ever written. They 
not only serve as data banks and heuristic sources for generating 
theories; they also clarify a host of practical problems such as judi-
cial functions, selection, proprieties, and policy development. As 
leadership studies they contribute to far broader fronts of inquiry 
than the judiciary or public law. The great strength of Mason's bi-
ographies, in short, is their vibrant legal realism: the credo of law in 
action becomes "judges & co." in action. 
The weaknesses perceived by contemporary critics are also in-
structive. These reduce to three main complaints: imbalanced cov-
erage, improper evidence, and partisanship. 
( 1) Coverage. Brandeis disappointed some analysts for too 
little attention to the Justice's service on the Supreme Court, Taft 
for too much selectivity.J6 Stone drew fire for insufficient weaving 
of the jurist's pre-judicial experiences with his evolving philosophy 
of the judicial function. All biographies are vulnerable to criticism 
over coverage because they involve three angles of vision: subject, 
writer, and reader. Enjoying the advantages of hindsight, I agree 
with Charles Grove Haines17 that Mason shortchanged Brandeis's 
greatest majority opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, Is which 
substantially eliminated federal common law and redistributed judi-
cial power in the United States. Administrative law was slighted as 
well. 
Fully as he mined the Stone papers, I wish Mason had ac-
cented more Stone's role as one of this country's greatest legal edu-
cators. More could have been made of how Stone's teaching of 
equity affected his judicial philosophy of balancing interests. 
Stone's lesson to students in 191 0--a "balance of convenience" is 
necessary "when the public is involved" -was the nub of his ap-
proach which the Court accepted in dormant commerce, intergov-
ernmental tax immunities, and personal jurisdiction cases.J9 
Still, no biographer can cover everything. In extenuation, Carl 
B. Swisher's reactions are persuasive. Brandeis merited full-life 
treatment even had he not been confirmed as a Justice. Mason's 
chapters on the Supreme Court reflected "a more thorough di-
gesting of judicial materials" than any American biography to date; 
16. Haines, Book Review, 41 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 129 (1947); and Murphy, Book Re-
view, 54 J. AM. HIST. 188 (1967). 
17. Haines, supra note 16, at 130. 
18. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
19. Class notes in Equity I, 9, 18 (October 31, 1910), Harold R. Medina Papers, 
Princeton University. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); and New York v. United States, 
326 u.s. 572, 586 (1946). 
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in particular his chapter entitled "Holmes and Brandeis Dissent-
ing" demonstrated rare discernment.2o Mason's is still the fullest 
personal portrait yet rendered, despite the handicap of incomplete 
sources and superior treatment of some aspects by later biographers 
like Philippa Strum.21 When Brandeis's papers were finally opened, 
after years of academic infighting over access, little was found to 
alter the picture. Even the talented Alexander M. Bickel gleaned 
only The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis (1957), and 
Mason expressed no surprise over the revelations in Bruce Allen 
Murphy's The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection (1982). Brandeis 
to him was still a moral giant. Similarly, it made small sense for a 
scholar in his sixties to tackle Taft's extensive pre-judicial career, 
already covered by others. And if Mason exaggerated the influence 
of the "preferred freedoms" concept in the Roosevelt Court, he led 
the way to understanding the deep potential of the Carolene Prod-
ucts 22 footnote as a means of reconciling liberal jurisprudence with 
political democracy. 
(2) Evidence. Mason's evidence in Stone provoked a schol-
arly tempest. Given unrestricted access to "a formidable mass of 
Supreme Court documents-slip opinions in various stages of prep-
aration, memoranda to and from members of the Court, and Stone's 
own record of the manner in which certain crucial decisions were 
hammered into shape," he understood that "the freedom thus per-
mitted has been balanced by a corresponding responsibility" in se-
lection and interpretation.23 Respected critics thought he went too 
far. Allison Dunham saw no useful purpose or contribution to 
knowledge in publishing such confidential materials about decision 
making. Supreme Court opinions spoke for themselves in public 
evaluations.24 Edmond Cahn feared that revelation of judicial bar-
gaining, tactics, and squabbling, as in Smith v. Allwright,25 was divi-
sive and unfair to the principals who were barred from riposte.26 
Mark De Wolfe Howe raised issues of taste and premature exposure 
that returned in spades with Woodward and Armstrong's The 
Brethren (1979). In the aftermath of Stone, Justice Minton told 
20. Swisher, Book Review, 9 J. PoL 108 (1947). 
21. P. STRUM, LoUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE (1984). 
22. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 150 n.4 (1938). 
23. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE xi, xiii (1956). Mason told an interviewer: "On 
me alone rested responsibility of determining how he should stand before the bar of history 
and scholarship." 57 Princeton Alumni Weekly 9 (1957). 
24. Dunham, Book Review, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (1957). Mason answered the pri· 
vacy complaint in his, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 202 ( 1958). For a 
rebuttal to Dunham, see Peltason, supra note 6, at 224. 
25. 321 u.s. 649 (1944). 
26. Cahn, Eavesdropping on Justice, 184 NATION 15 (Jan. 5, 1957). 
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Mason that he had burned his judicial papers. Justice Black or-
dered a son to destroy his.21 After Stone, all Justices made arrange-
ments for disposition of their private and public papers. 
Mason had defenders, to be sure. "These critics have chosen to 
treat as a grave defect what is probably the book's chief value and 
unparalled contribution," Samuel J. Konefsky aptly observed.2s 
Judge Harold R. Medina praised the portrait's accuracy and can-
dor, while John P. Frank correctly predicted that greater openness 
about the Court would ensue.29 The more that judges made policy, 
the more the need for public understanding, warts and all. Scholars 
had no business shielding personal reputations from truth. 
There are genuine issues here of balancing privacy and public 
knowledge, of preserving candid collegial deliberations and avoid-
ing unanticipated intrusion in other people's litigation. Time, none-
theless, has contracted these questions of degree. The debate about 
proper evidence in Stone now seems "quaint and moot. "3o Biogra-
phies of Justice Murphy by myself and Sidney Fine lifted the veil a 
bit more by using papers of other Justices and their notes of secret 
conferences.3t David O'Brien's The Storm Center (1986) went fur-
ther by using the records of a sitting Justice, William J. Brennan, Jr. 
On the score of evidence none of these books engendered any con-
troversy. Mason broke the barrier and took the heat. 
3. Partisanship. The most serious criticism is that Mason be-
came an advocate and "uncritical alter ego" of his subjects.32 A 
quibble about Brandeis and Taft became the dominant complaint 
about Stone. Prominent legal historians-Paul L. Murphy,33 Leo-
nard W. Levy,34 and Mark DeWolfe Howe3s-took Mason to task 
for permitting his very success as a biographer to overcome his neu-
trality as a historian. "Partisan spirit" and astigmatic vision alleg-
edly produced a distorted, oversimplified, and vulgarized account of 
the Court. Critics charged, for example, that he exalted his central 
figures into heroes by denigrating their opponents into villains. 
Scorn for Charles Evans Hughes infected the whole institutional 
27. H. BLACK, MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 250-55 (1975). 
28. Konefsky, Book Review, 52 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 1135 (1957). 
29. Medina, "Mason's Stone," 57 Princeton Alumni Weekly 9 (1957); Frank, Book Re-
view, 9 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1958). 
30. Dennis J. Hutchinson, remarks at a panel entitled "Whither Judicial Biography?" 
at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 1985. 
31. J. HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1968); Fine, 
supra note 8. 
32. Levy, Book Review, 63 AM. HIST. REV. 152 (1957-58). 
33. Murphy, Book Review, II W. PoL. Q. 413 (1958). 
34. Levy, supra note 32. 
35. Howe, Book Review, 62 PoL. Sci. Q. 122 (1957). 
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drama, leaving readers to wonder whether Stone's reputation could 
not stand on its own merits. Silence about liberal decisions by con-
servatives and doctrinal gropings by liberals left unfair impressions 
of Sutherland and Roberts. Complex issues and alignments in a pe-
riod of great legal flux were oversimplified by labels such as "Four 
Horsemen" and "Three Musketeers." Special pleading, moreover, 
magnified the problem of using confidential private papers. Viewing 
Justices at work through a single keyhole, Howe argued, necessarily 
neglects the other side. 
Frankly, some of this is true. Mason's dislike of Hughes was a 
standing joke among his graduate students of my generation. Five 
years ago, assuming that time had banked the fire, I tried out some 
revisionist thoughts with him: Why did Hughes awe most of his 
judicial colleagues?36 What would Mason himself have done as 
chief justice facing such a divided Court? Mason snorted: "Well, at 
least I am not a dual federalist!" 
Deeper issues of biographical vision lurk here. The more a bi-
ographer gets inside the central character, the harder it becomes to 
remain an outside, neutral observer. The problem is not so much 
partisan spirit as unconsciously becoming a captive of the subject's 
private illusions. Psychologists say that everyone perceives life 
through self-centered filters. Egocentric bias is universal in organiz-
ing memory.37 How should observers compensate? 
One way, Mason's way, is to take advantage of it. A single 
keyhole heightens perception. His "peephole jurisprudence" in the 
life of Stone followed a distinguished line of artists. John Updike 
recently speculated that the Dutch master Vermeer achieved the 
sparkling presence and photographic perspective of his sole land-
scape, View of Delft, by using an optical device, called a camera 
obscura, which turned his entire studio into a camera by closing the 
shutters on all but a small, lenslike hole through which he viewed 
the town below.3s The opposite way is to extend the sphere. Henry 
James drew complex perceptual maps for scenes in his late novels to 
insure that observations came from the characters rather than the 
omniscient author. Similarly, Howe suggested that Mason should 
have waited for passions to cool and the papers of other Justices to 
become available in order to present a fairer, fuller record. That 
remedy is more viable now than then, ironically by virtue of the 
criticized work. The downside is to increase drastically the oppor-
36. See D. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process in W. 
MURPHY & C. PRITCHETI, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 497 (1961); Freund, Charles 
Evans Hughes as Chief Justice. 81 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1967). 
37. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1984, at Cl. 
38. J. UPDIKE, JUST LOOKING: EssAYS ON ART 24 (1989). 
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tunity costs of writing biography. Biographers tend to accept these 
standards today but are overwhelmed with raw material. 
How much can we repress subjectivity? In the late 1950s, Jas-
per Johns painted common objects like numbers and flags ostensibly 
to eliminate the artist's personal feelings. Now critics see these 
works as autobiographical. Behavioral scientists of that era had 
similar aspirations and responses. After deconstructionism and its 
interdisciplinary counterparts, we no longer expect neutral or objec-
tive observation of law and politics. That also is a question of de-
gree. Though Taft showed Mason's ability to work with subjects 
whose political principles he deplored, I have often wondered 
whether he could have produced such exciting biographies had he 
lacked political passion. My guess is no. One clue came from his 
closest biographical rival, Carl Swisher. When I asked why he had 
written no more biographies after Field 39 and Taney, 4() he replied 
that successful biographies require empathy between writer and 
subject and no other Justice interested him enough. Another clue 
was Justice Brennan's recent call to lawyers for human passion as 
well as professional craftsmanship in the living law.41 A final clue 
was a remark Mason made at our last meeting: looking back he 
thought teaching is where immortality, if any, lies for professors. 
Alpheus Mason was a great teacher. His enthusiasms for free 
government and the judiciary's role in achieving it were utterly con-
tagious. Teaching and scholarship for him were a seamless whole. 
That is why his contributions to the art of judicial biography are an 
inspiration and a challenge.42 He exemplified both sides of Carlyle's 
equation: "a well-written life is almost as rare as a well-spent 
one."43 
39. C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN Of THE LAW (1930). 
40. C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935). 
41. W. Brennan, Jr., Reason. Passion and the Progress of the Law, 42 Record of 
N.Y.C.B.A. 948 (1987). 
42. S. Konefsky, supra note 28, at 1137. 
43. Quoted in Mason, supra note 2, at 396. 
